Planning for Failure
The Tragedy of Operation Market Garden


Erik Huizing
Presented to Dr. Ferris
HTST 489


	The Allied situation in September 1944 was one of crisis. The
previous three months had been witness to a break out from Normandy, and
rapid Allied advance through France and Belgium.  SHAEF's optimistic
estimate was to have 12 divisions on the Seinne by September 4 . In
reality, 24 divisions were waiting at or near the Siegfreid Line. The
resultant crisis was a direct consequence of this rapid advance. A
combination of garrisons left behind to defend the major ports and the
lack of a railway system in France frustrated the Allied logistical
effort. By September 1944, the Allied logistical system was stretched to
its limits. Montgomery had advanced 250 miles from Cherbourg; Patton, 400
miles. For what its worth, it was not a lack of supplies but a lack of
transport and port capacity that beleagued Allied logistics. Bombing of
the French railway system had been successful. While it had hampered
German efforts to contain the Normandy invasion, it now detracted Allied
logistical efforts. Compounding matters, the only open Allied port at the
end of August was Cherbourg, which was stockpiled with 70,000 tons of
supplies . Le Havre was captured on September 12. Boulongne would be
captured on the 22nd, and Calais on the 30th, too late for Market-Garden .
Europe's largest port, Antwerp, was also in Allied hands, but the Scheldt
Estuary leading to the port still lay in German hands. Several attempts
were made to alleviate to improvise a solution to the supply problem, but
they were hardly substitutes to functional ports.

	Prior to the supply crisis, Eisenhower had been employing a broad
front strategy, a continual advance along the entire front. The strategy
worked well initially, but the arrival of more divisions in France took
their toll on the logistical system. The rapid advance toward Germany
ground to a near-halt, as supplies became more and more scarce. Until more
ports were available, the broad front strategy would not work .
Strategically, Eisenhower had three choices. First, an effort could be
made to open the approaches to Antwerp, and thus alleviate the supply
problem. The immediate benefit was that supplies could be delivered right
up to the front lines of the 21st Army Group. Montgomery, however, claimed
that the task would take weeks to clear. The time spent clearing the
Scheldt estuary would be wasted, as it allowed the Germans time to
regroup, and possibly regain the initiative. Instead, Montgomery proposed
a rapid advance into Holland, across the Rhine, with the intention of
striking at the Rhur, and destroying Germany's war industry, thus denying
her the ability to wage war. Montgomery had also issued an ultimatum to
Eisenhower on September 4th, stating

"1) I consider we have now reached a stage where one really powerful and
full blooded thrust toward Berlin is likely to get there and thus end the
German war. 
2) We have not enough maintenance resources for two full blooded thrusts.
3) The selected thrust must have all the maintenance resources it needs
without any qualification and any other  peration must do the best it can
with what is left over."
4) There are only two possible thrusts: one via the Rhur and the other
via Metz and the Saar. 
5) In my opinion the thrust likely to give the best and quickest results
is the northern one via the Rhur.
6) Time is vital and the decision regarding the thrust must be made at
once and par. 3 above will apply. 
7) If we attempt a compromise solution and split our maintenance
resources so that neither thrust is full blooded we will prolong the war. 
8) I consider the problem viewed as above is very simple and clear cut.
9) The matter is of such vital importance that I feel sure you will agree
that a decision on the above lines is required at once. If you are coming
this way, perhaps you would look in and discuss it. If so, delighted to
see you, lunch tomorrow. Do not feel that I can leave this battle just at
present."

	Lastly, Patton claimed allotting the bulk of the supplies to his
Third Army, he would smash through the Seigfreid line, and be in Berlin
before Thanksgiving. Evidently, the prospect of a quick knock out from the
north was more alluring to Eisenhower. Additionally, pressure to maintain
a balance between the Allies prompted Eisenhower to side with Montgomery.  
However, he stipulated that a full thrust on Berlin was out of the
question, until the Antwerp was available for use.  Market-Garden promised
to deliver a swift, lethal punch to the heartland of German industry,
knocking it out, and bringing the war to an end. Secondary goals included
the encirclement of German troops in Holland, the destruction of V-2
launch sites, and a short path to Berlin.  On paper, the plan looked
promising, the Allies had excellent intelligence, and so far, were
victorious against the retreating Germans.  However, the plan was flawed
from its inception: the advance to the Rhine would be along a long, narrow
road. The deployment of the Allied Airborne Army would take place over
three days. The operation would also be taking place, even in the face of
reports German reinforcements arriving in the target area. Thus, the main
reason for the failure of Market-Garden was not bad intelligence, but
arrogance and ignorance on the part of the commanders, which lead to poor
intelligence dissemination.  

	At the beginning of the Second World War, the use of airborne
troops was in its infancy. By 1944, the use of paratroopers was in combat
operations was not uncommon. Dropping ahead of the advancing forces to
seize key bridges, airfields, rail junctions, roads, and other targets of
value were their chief purpose. The highly trained airborne troops were an
elite among the armed forces, often having volunteered to join the ranks
of the paratroopers.  Many lessons had been learned in the since the onset
of the war. The use of airborne troops (both paratroops and glider-borne)  
offers many advantages over conventional warfare. Deployment is much more
rapid, as forces fly into the target area.  The massive fortress at Eben
Enamel was taken, thanks to vertical envelopment by airborne troops.
Despite being lightly equipped, paratroopers had several important
advantages over conventional troops. Above all, surprise is the key
element in the operation of airborne troops.  Offsetting this advantage is
the tremendous planning effort required to make it possible. Organizing
the air armada that will transport an invasionary force can take weeks or
months. A willingness to cooperate between the airforce and the airborne
units must be present for planning to be effective. Furthermore, studies
in flak concentrations and terrain are important when planning an
operation. Suitable landing zones are required for the gliders, if heavy
equipment is to be used. Jeeps, light artillery, long range wireless sets,
extra ammunition, and supplies are vital to the survival of an airborne
force.  Another major advantage of airborne troops is the element of
surprise. Provided the planning was effective and secretive, total
surprise on enemy positions can be achieved. Secrecy in the planning and
execution is important, as the element of surprise will be lost. The
German landing on Crete were to unwittingly experience the results of a
landing on a prepared enemy. Another important lesson learned by landings
on Crete was not to land directly on top of the target area. The inability
to concentrate forces before an assault greatly reduced the effectiveness
of the airborne troops. The logical conclusion was to land a short
distance from the objective, concentrate and organize, then make the
assault. These lessons were heeded, perhaps too well, in the planning of
Market-Garden. 

	Market-Garden began life as Operation Comet. The underlying idea
of Comet was for the capture of bridges at Maas, Waal, and Arnhem. The key
difference in Comet and Market-Garden was the scale.  Comet would be
undertaken by the 1st Airborne Division, the Polish Brigade, the 4th
Parachute Brigade, and the Airborne 1st Airlanding Brigade. In total, only
one British division and one Polish Brigade would be deployed. Full plans
were made for the operation. After being postponed, then cancelled, Comet
became Market-Garden, with the addition of two American Divisions, the
82nd and the 101st. A total of 33,971 men would participate in the
landings, 20,190 by parachute, the rest by glider. In addition, 5,230 tons
of equipment, 1927 vehicles, and 568 guns would also be sent in.
Market-Garden was planned in ten days, mostly because of its similarities
to Comet . No changes were made for the advance of the ground forces .
Montgomery's plan was "to capture and hold the crossings over the canals
and rivers on which the Second Army's main axis of advance from around
Eindhoven to Arnhem inclusive". Following the airborne assault, code-named
Market, Garden would begin with the XXX Corps advancing to Arnhem. The
advance would be lead by the Guards Armoured division, followed up by
infantry from the 43rd Wessex and the 50th Northumbrian. The plan called
for the capture of all the bridges leading to Arnhem, including the
'bridge too far' across the Rhine. Following the airborne assault, the XXX
Corps would jump off from their starting point on the Dutch-Belgian
border. Market-Garden would be complete when XXX Corps crossed the Rhine
at Arnhem. The results of the operation are a stark contrast to the plan.
While the land forces made it past Nijmegen, it was a difficult trek; the
single road was dubbed "Hell's Highway". In the end, German reinforcements
overwhelmed the paratroopers holding out at Arnhem. In most basic terms,
the result of operation Market-Garden a 50-mile road to nowhere. The cause
for failure was not execution of the plan, but the plan itself.

	From its inception, Market-Garden had several severe flaws. Three
key areas are worth examination: a failure to appreciate German strength,
failure in terrain analysis, and failure in weather analysis. The failure
to appreciate German strength had the most severe impact on the British
1st Airborne at Arnhem. Failures in terrain analysis included picking the
route of attack for XXX Corps, as well as the landing and drop zones.
Finally, weather also had a detremental effect on the proceedings of both
Market and Garden. Previously enjoyed air superiority was absent during
the critical days. Additionally, adverse weather effected the second and
third airborne deployments. These areas of failure all have their roots in
the decision to mount the operation, which was made by the commanders,
despite having more than adequate information on the situation. 

The failure to appreciate German strength is the most tragic aspect of
Market-Garden. Appreciation differs from acknowledgement in that if
pertinent information is properly appreciated, suitable changes may be
made to a plan. General Browning's intelligence staff had intelligence
from various sources (prisoners, resistance), that there was a
significantly higher concentration of armour than previously believed.
Unfortunately, there was plenty of reason to ignore reports of
reinforcements arriving. Because some of the sources of information were
unreliable (the Dutch Resistance was seen as uncooperative), many reports
were considered to be groundless, and warranted no incorporation into the
general picture. Additionally, the planners and intelligence staff were
not privy to Ultra decrypts, which was still a tightly kept secret. Four
days before the launch of Market-Garden, Major Brian Urquhart expressed
concerns about reports of the presence of the 9th and 10th Panzer
divisions. A reconnaissance Spitfire was sent out confirmed the presence
of new Mark III and IV tanks, only 8 miles from the drop zone . Browning
treated Urquhart s fear that the drop zone was in danger as "a nervous
child suffering from a nightmare" . The new information was ignored,
because there was no time to review and verify it, with the deadline so
close . Because Browning chose to ignore signs of reinforcement, the units
going into battle were not properly informed as to the presence of the 9th
and 10th Panzer divisions . They were merely mentioned as worn out or
disorganized battalions in Arnhem for rest and refitting.

	There were also many emotional reasons for launching the
operation. None of the parachute units had seen action since Normandy, and
anxious to go into battle, regardless of the circumstances. Stated
Corporal Bob Allen of the 3rd Battalion: "Oh yes, a little German armour
was reputed to be refitting in the Arnhem area. But morale was sky high.
Most of us were straining to get off the leash." There was general
over-confidence among the troops for various reasons. Since August, the
Allies had been fighting a disorganized, retreating German army, offering
only token resistance.  Most units also believed they would be facing
limited opposition for a short period of time:  

"They told us the destination and the limited opposition - old men and the
invalids from the Russian Front; Home Guard type opposition was inferred -
and we would probably be relieved after two days. Our Forward Observation
party was told that we were going straight to the bridge and there would
be a separation from the main unit for twenty four hours. You tend to hope
that it was all true. You realize that it couldn't be as easy as that, but
you hoped it was."

In reality, Urquhart's reconnaissance force would never be reunited with
the main body of troops. The attitudes and thoughts of the soldiers
illustrate how severe the failure in dissemination was.  The intelligence
staff knew the area was being reinforced. Reports indicated a
reorganization of German forces under Model, who based his headquarters in
Arnhem. Despite all indications that the Arnhem area was being reinforced,
the common soldiers were not properly informed. Being ill informed,
inadequate weapons were brought along. Having better equipment, such as
more anti-armour weapons, the paratroopers may have held out longer, but
this would not have affected the outcome of Market-Garden, as the Arnhem
area was still being reinforced by high quality troops, not boys and old
men on bicycles.

	The deployment of forces also suffered heavily because of the
choices made by Browning. Although the drops were largely successful (a
99.8% success rate is cited), many of the units were scattered, or slow to
form up. Missing reconnaissance and wireless jeeps owed to the fact that
there were some glider crashes. The parachute drop had completed by
2:10pm. Over an hour later, reports were circulating that Reconnaissance
Squadron had 'lost its transport'.  The Reconnaissance Squadron's jeeps
arrived out of order, and pressed for time, No. 2 jeep left for Arnhem
before No. 1 jeep carrying the wireless arrived.  Fifteen minutes later,
the Reconnaissance squadron finally left. The first effort by the
Reconnaissance squadron ended at 3:45pm, with seven deaths and 4 captured
. Immediately, Major-General Roy Urquhart was pressed to mount another
reconnaissance attempt. The duration of the operation would be spent by
Urquhart shuttling between bases, often out of contact with most of his
forces, thus unable to adequately perform his role. Spacing out the
deployments also gave the Germans more time to react to the operation.
Reports of parachute landings pointed directly toward the objective: the
bridge over the Rhine at Arnhem. German reinforcement was all the more
swift, as Model's headquarters was in the path of the apparent advance.


	Failures in deployment were largely due to poor terrain analysis.
One of the lessons learned from Crete was not to drop directly on top of
the target area, but rather a short distance away from it, thus allowing
forces to concentrate before mounting an assault. Market-Garden took the
lesson to an extreme. Urquhart's forces were dropped eight miles away from
the Arnhem bridge, in mid afternoon, with the goal of reaching the target
area and securing it before night. In a report written in 1947, General
James Gavin, the commander of the 82nd airborne division, listed proximity
to objective as the most important factor when planning an airborne
assault. The decision to drop 6 to 8 miles from the target was made for
reasons of landing the largest amount of materiel safely. Intelligence
reports had shown that there was a 35% increase in flak positions in the
area, during the time leading up to September 16th. Second, there seemed
to be no other suitable drop zones that would support the number of troops
to be dropped. Finally, the terrain near the target areas was believed to
be soft to support glider landings. In effect, this assessment was false.
The reports, which were based on both imagery, and information from Dutch
officers who had lived in the area, were exaggerated. It was the
concentrations of flak positions that made it necessary to land so far
from the objective. The FAAA staff believed it was more beneficial to land
8 miles out, than to take 40% casualties while landing .  Montgomery would
later write that at least one parachute brigade should have been dropped
close enough to capture the bridge within a few minutes of assembling.

	In addition to the selection of drop- and landing-zones, there was
also failure in the terrain analysis performed, on which XXX Corp's orders
were based on. Success in a deep-penetration airborne operation depends on
a speedy link-up with ground forces, as paratroopers are generally
incapable of defending their positions indefinitely. The original estimate
was that the British 1st Airborne would have to hold out "about 2 days, 4
days at most" . The advance up the single road was a poor decision for
many reasons. First, the road was narrow, barely wide enough for one tank,
and paralleled on either side by ditches. Restricted mobility and the
inability to maneuver off the road severely impeded XXX Corp's fighting
ability. Second, and advance along a single narrow road is very vulnerable
to flanking attacks, especially with the numerous corridors leading to the
advance route. XXX Corps would be easily ambushed on either side by German
88mm guns, which had little difficulty knocking out the Sherman Tanks .
Compounding matters, Montgomery's planning staff, which had also been in
Africa, knew very well of the destructive power of the 88 , especially at
close ranges. On September 17, nine Irish Guard's tanks were knocked out
in two minutes by German 88's, illustrating the severity of the situation.  
Finally, the advance to Arnhem had to follow a tight schedule. A delay in
the advance would propagate backwards, causing general confusion and
traffic jams which in turn caused further delays. Typically, when a
Sherman was knocked out, the advance would halt so that an engineering
bulldozer tank could push the obstacle out of the way. Attacks against the
advancing XXX Corps were common because of their single spearhead with
little protection on their flanks. The last impeding factor on
Market-Garden was the weather. It delayed badly needed resupply, and
reinforcement, and denied air support to the advancing XXX Corps.  The
weather forecast for September 16th was favorable, followed by three
marginal days. While terrain factors generally remain constant, and have
concrete information associated with them, weather is unpredictable beyond
one or two days. Weather became a deciding factor in the operation between
September 18th and the 23rd. By the 18th, it was expected that the
operation would be drawing to a close. If the weather had been
cooperative, the airborne forces would have been resupplied and reinforced
twice. They were heavily dependent on resupply to maintain their
positions. The original plan was to have four brigades holding the Arnhem
bridge, however because of a lack of aircraft, deployments were stretched
out over three lifts. On the 17th, only two of the four brigades were
present. In Urquhart's own words, they were "handicapped" by the decision
to deploy in three lifts . The decision to launch Market-Garden in the
face of uncertain weather was based on two factors: the Germans were known
to be reinforcing; the sooner the operation began, the weaker the Germans
would be. Second, chancing the weather was a risk Montgomery was willing
to take. This was an irresponsible action, mainly because of how heavily
Market-Garden depended on the reinforcement and resupply of the
paratroopers.

	Ultimately, it can be said that Operation Market-Garden failed
because of poor planning. The original 'Comet' plan was far too ambitions.
Evidence of this is that Market-Garden was essentially Comet on a larger
scale with more resources. In broad terms, Market-Garden failed because of
the combined effects of a lack of resupply during the critical days and a
slowed advance of ground forces. These failures owe themselves to
fundamental weaknesses in the plan. Relief to the paratroopers took two
forms, resupply, and link up with ground forces. Resupply and
reinforcement failed because weather did not permit them. While this
cannot be entirely blamed on planning, the choice was made to go ahead
with the operation, even in the face of less than favorable weather
conditions. Second, the linkup with ground forces failed because of a
poorly chosen path of advance. There was neither room to properly
maneuver, nor adequate defensive positions along Hell's Highway. In
addition, the ground forces were to advance in a very vulnerable
formation, according to a strict timetable, which was impossible to keep
up with. Despite the weaknesses in the plan, the go-ahead was still given,
mainly for reasons of anxiety, arrogance, and ignorance. The gains made by
Market-Garden were useless: a 50 mile road to nowhere, costing 17,000
casualties.  Montgomery s biographer stated "Monty's bid for the Rhur was
nothing less than foolhardy. It was an expensive squandering of men and
materiel."

"L'audace, toujours l'audace" - Frederick II

Bibliography

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https://calldbpub.leavenworth.army.mil (April 29, 1997 )

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New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993

Farrer-Hockley, Anthony. Airborne Carpet: Operation Market Garden
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